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Perceptions of the Causes of The Troubles 
in Northern Ireland 
M I C H E L E D I L L O N * 
University of California, Berkeley 
Abstract: This paper uses data collected in the Irish Mobility Study (1973) to explore intra-Catholic 
patterns of differentiation, and differences in the attitudes of Catholics and Protestants, towards the 
causes of The Troubles. It also documents different perceptions of the national identity of people living 
in the North. On the basis of these findings, the paper notes the added complexity involved in under­
standing the Northern Ireland problem when the unit of analysis is extended to include the whole island. 
It suggests that using a Gramscian approach, as has been proposed by Fulton (1988), who argues that 
the conflict should be conceptualised in terms of an all-Ireland Catholic-nationalist bloc in opposition 
to a Protestant-loyalist bloc, is not as straightforward as it appears. The paper also suggests that any 
analysis of Ireland needs to be sensitive to the importance of jurisdictional location in culturally dif­
ferentiating the Catholic population. 
I I N T R O D U C T I O N 
I n a comprehensive appraisal of the varying explanations of the Nor thern Ireland problem, Whyte (1988) finds four alternative, though not mutu­
ally exclusive, interpretations: the nationalist; the unionist; Marxist interpre­
tations; and internal conflict theories. Whyte sees the latter as the dominant 
interpretation, and suggests that its populari ty may be indicative of a develop­
ing consensus on the Northern Ireland problem. While Whyte (1983) acknowl­
edges the impor tant contributions of Marxist analyses to the study of Northern 
Ireland, he argues, none the less, that "Religious and national identities carry 
w i t h them an emotional load which class difference by itself seems unable to 
evoke" (1983, p. 15). In an earlier article, Whyte argued that the intensity of 
emotions which the Northern Ireland conflict stimulates is part ly due to the 
fact that there are tensions w i t h i n the two Northern communities (1978, 
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p. 278) . Accordingly, his preference is for internal-conflict theories, i n par­
ticular a social-psychological approach, and one which studies intra-ethnic 
tensions ( ib id . ) . 
More recently, Fu l ton (1988), using a Gramscian perspective, has extended 
the uni t of analysis to include the whole of Ireland. Rather than treating 
Nor thern Ireland as a self-contained enti ty separate f rom the rest of Ireland, 
i t is his posit ion that the whole island of Ireland should constitute the focus 
of any analysis. While Ful ton acknowledges the inst i tut ional separation and 
the development of separate social structures w i t h i n the two jurisdictions, 
nevertheless, drawing expl ic i t ly on Gramsci, he argues that: 
Viewed f rom a Gramscian perspective, Roman Catholicism can be seen 
as part of the hegemonic culture of the Republic and of the Northern 
Catholic-nationalist remnant, along w i t h republicanism, nationalism and 
welfare capitalism (1988, p. 18). 
Opposing the Catholic-nationalist historical bloc there is a Protestant-loyalist 
bloc, and according to Ful ton , these two blocs constitute the underlying 
structures of the Northern Ireland conflict . Fu l ton discusses what he terms 
Catholic monopoly politics in the Republic of Ireland, and notes that given 
the minor i ty status of Protestants in the whole of Ireland (20%), 
. . . the Protestant loyalists of Ulster are right and not wrong about the 
Catholic monol i th , and the Catholic structuring of the Southern state 
culture (1988, p. 17). 
The extension of the uni t of analysis to include the whole of Ireland under­
scores the complexities involved in analysing the Northern Ireland problem. 
I n adopting a Gramscian perspective, however, we are alerted to a further 
complexity which has its source in the cultural differences w i t h i n the Irish 
Catholic populat ion. Whether or not we agree w i t h Fu l ton that a Catholic 
mono l i th exists in Ireland, research findings indicate that there are significant 
differences w i t h i n the Irish Catholic populat ion. I t is these findings which 
constitute the main focus of this paper. 
The paper w i l l show that for Irish Catholics, living in separate legal juris­
dictions (however artificial the init ial drawing of the boundaries may have 
been) appears to result in significant at t i tudinal differences. We w i l l see that 
despite their shared ethnicity and religious aff i l iat ion, the attitudes of Irish 
Catholics to the causes of The Troubles were differentiated in accordance 
w i t h their being members of one of the two legal jurisdictions in Ireland. Living 
in separate jurisdictions also appears to give rise to different perceptions of 
the national ident i ty of people living in Northern lrelar.d. 
The purpose of the paper is to suggest that given the existence of intra-
Catholic a t t i tudinal differences, we may need to exercise caution in applying 
Gramsci's (1971) theoretical construct of an historical bloc to Irish Catholicism-
nationalism. We recognise that Gramsci's conceptualisation of an historical 
bloc is not that of a homogeneous and unified group, but connotes the col­
laboration of various classes or social fractions which can then serve as an 
alliance against an external threat. I n the case of Ireland, can the intra-Catholic 
differences be assimilated or sufficiently tailored to persuade them to col­
laborate together in opposing Protestant dominat ion, or in challenging the 
legitimacy of the Brit ish State in Nor thern Ireland? Are Irish Catholic percep­
tions too divergent to enable the negotiation of a single commonsense view 
of the Nor thern Ireland conflict among Northern and Southern Catholics? 
I I D A T A A N D M E T H O D 
This paper uses evidence collected from a sample of males in Ireland during 
the winter of 1973/74. The data come f rom the Irish M o b i l i t y Study which 
was a survey of the male labour forces of the Republic and Northern Ireland, 
based on personal interviews of economically active males aged 18 to 64. The 
sample was drawn so as to be self-weighting and a response rate of 78.9 per 
cent was achieved (O Muircheartaigh and Wiggins, 1977). This was a relatively 
non-violent period in Northern Ireland, fol lowing one o f its most violent 
years (1972) . However, given that the survey was not conducted in the after­
math of a major violent incident, the responses to the questions asked appear 
to be more indicative of a general underlying atti tude towards The Troubles, 
than of a transitory reactive disposition. 
Using data collected in 1973/74 raises problems of recency. This issue, 
however, is minimised in a study where the primary focus concerns patterns 
of differences among the two Catholic groups rather than current perceptions 
of the causes of the confl ict . 
The mob i l i t y study provided information on occupational histories which 
have been extensively analysed elsewhere (see Hout (1989) for example). I t 
also included a range of behavioural and at t i tudinal items. For present pur­
poses, this paper uses a set of questions which sought respondents' attitudes 
towards the main causes of The Troubles, and perceptions of national ident i ty . 
Given the small number of Southern Protestants interviewed (N=89) , we 
omit ted these and confined the statistical analysis to the remaining three 
groups - Southern Catholics (N=2,180), Northern Catholics (N=849) , and 
Northern Protestants ( N = l , 5 2 3 ) . 
I l l F INDINGS 
Most Frequently Endorsed Items 
When we look at the most frequently endorsed causes of The Troubles we 
see that for each of the two Catholic groups certain items tended to cluster (see 
Table 1). Northern Catholics most frequently endorsed Internment (90%), 
and the existence of the Special Powers A c t (86%) as causes. Employment 
discrimination (82%) and housing discrimination (76%) also received strong 
endorsement, providing support for the argument that the grievances of the 
Catholics in the N o r t h of Ireland have a socio-economic dimension. The 
government at Stormont (77%), the influence of the Orange Order (76%), 
and the activi ty of the U V F (74%) were also perceived as causes. I t is note­
wor thy that 70 per cent of the Northern Catholics expressed the opinion that 
the activi ty of the I R A was a cause. 
Table 1: Perception of the Causes of The Troubles 
Agreement AUCa NC 
Percentage 
SC NP 
Religion 62 48 72 58 
Partition 54 49 56 57 
British army 65 54 69 13 
IRA activity 68 70 67 97 
Schools 47 45 48 57 
Orange Order 89 76 94 27 
Disloyal Catholics 39 33 42 70 
Housing 89 76 94 35 
Employment 92 82 96 18 
Neighbourhood 47 58 46 55 
Special Powers Act 86 86 85 34 
Stormont government 74 77 74 42 
Labour party 1969 31 27 33 85 
Dublin government 40 41 40 93 
Catholic Church 27 23 28 49 
U V F activity 93 74 87 43 
Internment 92 90 92 45 
N = 3,029 849 2,180 1,523 
Note: NP=NorthernProtestants;AllC=A11 Catholics;NC=NorthernCatholics;SC=Southern 
Catholics. 
From the perspective of the Southern Catholics employment discrimination 
was the most frequently endorsed item (96%). Closely fol lowing this was 
housing discrimination (94%), and the influence of the Orange Order (94%). 
Internment (92%), the activity of the U V F (87%), and the existence of the 
Special Powers A c t (85%) were also perceived as primary causes. I t is signifi­
cant that Southern Catholics more frequently stated the Stormont government 
(74%), religion (72%), and the Brit ish army (69%), rather than the activi ty 
of the I R A (67%), as causes of The Troubles. 
Differences between Southern and Northern Catholics 
I t was evident that Southern Catholics (SC) and Northern Catholics (NC) 
significantly differed f rom each other in their perceptions of causes. This was 
true w i t h regard to employment discrimination (SC 96%:NC 82%), housing 
discrimination (SC 94%:NC 76%), the Orange Order (SC 94%:NC 76%), 
the activi ty of the U V F (SC 87%:NC 74%), religion (SC 72%:NC 48%) , 
the Bri t ish army (SC 69%:NC 54%), neighbourhood segregation (SC 46%: 
NC 58%), and the disloyalty o f Catholics (SC 42%:NC 33%). 
When a number of sociological variables were controlled for, using the 
SPSSx crosstabs procedure w i t h the chi-square test of statistical significance 
— education, type of lifestyle (as measured by number and type of consumer 
goods owned by the respondent), urban/rural location, subjective social class, 
religiosity, mass media patterns, and whether or not respondent was affiliated 
w i t h a pol i t ical party — the differences between the Southern and Northern 
Catholics were maintained (see Table 2) . There were exceptions on two items. 
Regarding the Brit ish army, the Nor th /South difference between Catholics 
disappeared for those who had completed second level education, and for 
those who lived in an urban area. The Nor th /South difference disappeared 
w i t h respect to neighbourhood segregation bo th for those who were pol i t ical ly 
affiliated, and for those who lived in a rural area. 
I t also emerged that the responses of the Southern Catholics to the causes 
of The Troubles were not significantly differentiated in accordance w i t h 
membership o f a particular pol i t ical party, even though the pol i t ical parties 
in the Republic have varying philosophies regarding the Northern Ireland pro­
blem. Overall, therefore, the data indicated significant differences between 
Southern and Northern Catholics. 
We may postulate, however, that the cultural un i ty of Southern Catholics 
was somewhat art if icial , reflecting the relative arbitrariness of the boundary 
drawn between the Republic and Northern Ireland. We can ask, therefore, d id 
Southern Catholics who lived closer to the conflict i n Northern Ireland, that 
is, in the border counties, have a view of the conflict more in tune w i t h Cath­
olics in the N o r t h than w i t h their fellow citizens in the Republic? Does living 
in the v ic in i ty of where the conflict is played out on a daily basis alter these 
individuals' perceptions of the causes of that conflict? Perhaps the actual 
physical distance of the majori ty o f Southern Catholics f rom The Troubles 
was accompanied by a social-psychological distance which made them per­
ceive the causes of the conflict differently. 
Table 2: Catholics' Perceptions of the Causes of The Troubles Crovstabulated by a Number 
of Variables 
Educ Life hoc Pol Rel SC News TV 
Pr Se Tr Mo Ur Ru Po Np Re Nr Mc Wc Ny Nn Ty Tn 
Agreement Percentage 
Religion 
SC: 74 70 73 71 65 75 73 68 71 73 73 73 71 76 72 75 
NC: 47 50 50 46 41 52 49 47 47 49 48 49 46 56 48 51 
British Army 
SC: 76 62 74 63 59 73 71 59 66 72 64 74 67 76 68 72 
NC; 52 57 59 48 64 49 60 42 47 59 4b 57 57 44 57 39 
Orange Order 
SC: 95 94 94 94 94 95 95 94 95 94 9<: 95 94 95 95 93 
NC: 74 78 78 72 87 69 80 66 73 77 73 77 80 56 79 56 
Catholics 
SC: 41 43 41 43 46 41 42 43 43 42 41 40 42 41 42 42 
NC: 33 33 34 32 30 35 35 29 37 31 3^ 32 33 32 33 34 
Housing 
SC: 94 94 92 95 94 94 94 94 95 93 92 95 94 93 93 94 
NC: 77 78 79 75 82 75 80 74 78 78 72 79 79 73 78 77 
Employment 
SC: 97 96 95 97 96 96 96 96 97 95 97 96 97 95 96 96 
NC: 81 83 85 79 82 75 85 77 83 82 76 84 83 81 83 76 
Neighbourhood 
SC: 41 52 56 50 47 56 45 55 55 52 54 54 52 60 52 60 
NC: 48 35 45 38 65 54 42 44 43 42 45 42 61 45 60 44 
U V F activity 
SC: 91 84 89 84 84 89 88 82 86 88 86 89 86 91 87 88 
NC: 75 73 76 72 76 73 78 66 74 74 76 74 75 72 74 74 
Note: Educ: Educational level; Pr=Primary; Se=Secondary; 
Life: Lifestyle, Tr=Traditional; Mo=Modern; 
Loc: Location; Ur=Urban; Ru=Rural; 
Pol: Politically affiliated; Po=yes; Np=no; 
Rel: Religiosity; Rel=very; Nr=not religiou; 
SC: Subjective social class; Mc=middle; WC=working; 
News: Read newspaper regularly; Ny=yes; Nn=no; 
T V : Watch television regularly; Ty=yes; Tn=no. 
In order to test this question we subdivided the Southern Catholics accord­
ing to whether or not they lived in a border county, and we then compared 
their attitudes to the causes of the conflict . This analysis shows that for the 
most part the differences between Southern and Northern Catholics remained, 
w i t h the exception of a select number of causes where Southern Catholics 
living in non-border counties differed significantly from those living in the 
border counties (see Table 3). The latter had a significantly greater tendency 
to endorse religion, the presence of the British army, the failure of both the 
NI Labour government and the Dublin government to control the IRA, and 
Catholic disloyalty, as causes. 
Table 3: Attitudes towards the Causes of The Troubles Crosstabulated by Southern 
Catholics, Border and Non-border counties, and Northern Catholics 
Southern Northern 
Causes Non-border Border Cathoi 
Percentage 
Religion 71 80* 48 
Partition 55 58 49 
British Army 68 80* 54 
I R A activity 67 68 70 
Schools 48 45 45 
Orange Order 94 96 76 
Disloyal Catholics 41 50* 33 
Housing 94 94 76 
Employment 97 89 82 
Neighbourhood 47 42 58 
Special Powers Act 85 91 86 
Stormont government 75 67 77 
Labour party 30 51* 27 
Dublin government 39 52* 41 
Catholic Church 27 31 23 
U V F activity 86 93 74 
Internment 92 97 90 
N = 1,957 223 849 
•Indicates chi square significant at the .05 level when comparing border and non-border 
Southern Catholics. 
What is noteworthy about this finding, however, is that contrary to our 
expectation, Southern Catholics in the border counties were more distant on 
these items from Catholics in the North, than were the Southern Catholics who 
lived in non-border counties. Notwithstanding this deviation, overall, there 
were fewer attitudinal differences between border and non-border Southern 
and Northern Catholics. 
Southern Catholics, Northern Catholics, and Protestants 
Just as Northern and Southern Catholics significantly differed from each 
other in their perceptions of the causes of The Troubles, it was also evident 
that they both disagreed w i t h Northern Protestants. Onev/ay analysis of vari­
ance w i t h the Scheffe mult iple comparison test (using the SPSSx procedure), 
indicated statistically significant differences between the three groups in their 
perceptions of the causes (see Table 4) . 
Table 4: Analysis of Variance of the Causes of The Troubles for Northern Protestants, 
Northern Catholics, and Southern Catholics 
Cause 
Groups 
1 2 3 
NP NC SC 
F Test* Scheffe Test 
lv2 lv3 2v3 
Religion 
Mean 3.2 2.8 3.7 99.02* 
Standard Deviation 1.7 1.7 1.5 
Partition 
Mean 3.2 3.0 3.2 6.18* 
Standard Deviation 1.7 1.6 1.6 
British Army 
Mean 1.6 3.1 3.6 893.03* 
Standard Deviation 1.1 1.6 1.5 
IRA activity 
Mean 4.8 3.5 3.5 530.75* 
Standard Deviation 0.7 1.5 1.5 
Schools segregation 
Mean 3.2 2.8 2.9 23.13* 
Standard Deviation 1.7 1.7 1.6 
Orange Order 
Mean 2.1 3.8 4.4 1,724.49* 
Standard Deviation 1.4 1.4 0.9 
Disloyal Catholics 
Mean 3.6 2.4 2.8 243.04* 
Standard Deviation 1.4 1.5 1.5 
UVF activity 
Mean 2.6 3.6 4.1 557.47* 
Standard Deviation 1.6 1.4 1.2 
Internment 
Mean 2.7 4.4 4.4 889.95* 
Standard Deviation 1.6 1.1. 1.0 
Housing 
Mean 2.4 3.8 4.5 1,303.13* 
Standard Deviation 1.4 1.4 0.9 
Employment 
Mean 1.8 4.1 4.6 3,173.44* 
Standard Deviation 1.3 1.3 0.8 
Table 4 continued 
Cause 1 
Groups 
2 3 F Test* Scheffe Test 
NP NC SC lv2 lv3 2v3 
Neighbourhood 
Mean 3.2 3.3 2.8 24.93* * * 
Standard Deviation 1.7 1.7 1.6 
Special Powers A ct 
Mean 2.4 4.2 4.0 859.02* * * * 
Standard Deviation 1.5 1.2 1.2 
Stormont government 
Mean 2.7 4.0 3.8 292.24* * * * 
Standard Deviation 1.6 1.4 1.5 
Labour party 
Mean 4.2 2.2 2.5 908.73* * * * 
Standard Deviation 1.3 1.4 1.3 
Dublin government 
Mean 4.5 2.6 2.7 936.46* * * 
Standard Deviation 1.0 1.5 1.5 
Catholic Church 
Mean 3.0 2.0 2.2 142.82* * * * 
Standard Deviation 1.6 1.4 1.5 
N = 1,523 849 2,180 
Note: NP=Northern Protestants; NC=Northern Catholics; SC=Southern Catholics; 
F test: * indicates signifiance at the .05 level; 
Scheffe test: * indicates significant inter-group differences at the .05 level. 
I t was evident that Nor thern Protestants differed f rom the t w o Catholic 
groups w i t h respect to religion, the presence of the Brit ish army, the I R A , 
schools segregation, the Orange Order, disloyal Catholics, the U V F , intern­
ment, housing discrimination, employment discrimination, the Special Powers 
A c t , Stormont , the failure of the Brit ish Labour party which was then in 
government to control the I R A , the failure of the Dubl in government to stop 
the I R A from operating across the border, and the posit ion of the Catholic 
Church in the South. 
Nor thern Catholics and Protestants differed on all of the causes w i t h the 
exception of neighbourhood segregation. Nor thern Catholics assigned a higher 
score to the presence of the Bri t ish army, the Orange Order, the U V F , intern­
ment, housing discrimination, employment discrimination, the Special Powers 
Act , and Stormont. Contrasting w i t h this pattern, the Protestants assigned a 
higher score to religion, par t i t ion , the I R A , schools segregation, disloyal Cath­
olics, the failure of the Labour party, the failure o f the Dubl in government, 
and the posit ion of the Catholic Church in the South (see Table 4) . 
The Southern Catholics differed from the Northern Protestants on all the 
causes w i t h the exception of par t i t ion. They gave a higher score to religion, 
the Brit ish army, the Orange Order, the U V F , internment, housing discrimi­
nation, employment discrimination, the Special Powers A c t , and Stormont. 
I n contrast, they assigned a lower score than the Protestants to the I R A , 
schools segregation, disloyal Catholics, neighbourhood segregation, the failure 
of the Labour party, the failure of the Dubl in government, and the position 
of the Catholic Church in the South. 
The Southern and Northern Catholics differed from each other in that the 
former assigned a higher score than the latter to religion, par t i t ion , the pre­
sence of the Brit ish army, the Orange Order, Catholic disloyalty, the U V F , 
housing discrimination, employment discrimination, the failure of the Labour 
party, and the posi t ion of the Catholic Church in the South. I n contrast, 
Southern Catholics assigned a lower score than their Northern counterparts 
to neighbourhood segregation, the Special Powers A c t , and Stormont. The 
two Catholic groups assigned a similar score to the activity of the I R A , schools 
segregation, internment, and the failure of the Dubl in government to control 
the I R A , as causes. 
National Identity; Unification of Ireland 
Leaving aside for the moment the respondents' differentiated perceptions 
of the causes of The Troubles, we can consider a broader question — percep­
tions of national ident i ty in Ireland. These findings highlight not only the 
differences between Northern Catholics and Protestants, but they also accen­
tuate a difference in perception among people living in the Republic compared 
to those in the Nor th . From the Mob i l i t y Study data, Northern Catholics 
saw their national ident i ty as Irish (81%) rather than Brit ish, and as Irish (77%) 
rather than Ulstermen. The findings here thus supported Rose's argument 
that "an Irish ident i ty is natural to [Northern] Catholics" (Rose, 1971, p. 208). 
I n opposit ion to this, Northern Protestants considered themselves British 
(84%) rather than Irish, and Ulstermen (86%) rather than Irish. 
Unfortunately, parallel questions were not asked of respondents in the 
Republic. However, a survey in 1987 of a representative quota controlled 
sample of respondents in the Republic, found that 33 per cent considered the 
people of Nor thern Ireland as Irish, 15 per cent them as British, and 42 per 
cent considered them as both Irish and British (MRB1, 1987a, p. 50) . While 
account should be taken of the possible effects of t ime, sample, and question 
format differences on these responses, nevertheless, it does appear that res­
pondents in the Republic do not perceive the people of Northern Ireland as 
unequivocally Irish to the same extent that Northern Catholics perceived 
themselves. 
Furthermore, in the Republic, while 67 per cent see a united Ireland as 
"something to hope fo r " , and 56 per cent consider the Ir ish nat ion as con­
sti tuting 32 counties, almost half, 49 per cent, believe that Nor thern Ireland 
w i l l never be reunited w i t h the South ( ib id . , pp. 47-50). One possible impl i ­
cation of this relative pessimism in the possibility of a united Ireland, may be 
a lack of mot ivat ion among the populat ion i n the Republic (at least among this 
49%) to collaborate w i t h Nor thern Catholics in opposing Brit ish dominat ion. 
Moreover, i n a later po l l i n the Republic in 1987, only 20 per cent of those 
interviewed expressed the opinion that the Ext radi t ion A c t should "be 
scrapped complete ly" ( M R B I , 1987b, pp. 1-2). Given that Ext rad i t ion wou ld 
disfavour those who commit ted crimes in pursuit of Catholic/nationalist ideals, 
the fact that only a small minor i ty were against the A c t suggests at least a 
certain amount of ambivalence among people in the Republic regarding State 
control of violence in Nor thern Ireland. I t also indicates their latent support 
for official co-operation between the Republic and Brit ish States, and their 
tacit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the British State in Nor thern Ire­
land. This is so notwithstanding the fact that, as we discussed above, so few 
Nor thern Catholics identify w i t h their official Brit ish ident i ty . 
I V DISCUSSION 
The findings presented in this paper draw our at tention to the way in which 
politico-religious location differentiated attitudes in Ireland. The overall 
d is t r ibut ion of responses among the Catholic populat ion to the causes of the 
Nor thern Ireland conflict and to the ident i ty and unif icat ion questions, indi­
cated that their attitudes were differentiated in accordance w i t h their pol i t ico-
legal jur isdic t ion . We saw that there were significant differences between 
Northern and Southern Catholics w i t h respect to housing discrimination, 
employment discrimination, the Orange Order, the U V F , religion, the Brit ish 
army, neighbourhood segregation, and the disloyalty of Catholics, as causes 
of The Troubles. Moreover, this pattern of intra-Catholic differentiat ion was 
maintained when we broadened our analysis to include findings which related 
to national ident i ty and the unif icat ion of Ireland. 
We also observed that the two Catholic groups differed f rom the Nor thern 
Protestants in their perceptions of the causes of the confl ict . Northern Cath­
olics and Protestants differed on all of the causes except neighbourhood 
segregation. With the exception of par t i t ion , Southern Catholics perceived all 
of the causes differently f rom the Nor thern Protestants. Notwithstanding such 
Protestant/Catholic differences, however, the intra-Catholic differences illus­
trate the added complexi ty in understanding the Northern Ireland problem 
when the uni t of analysis is extended to include the whole island. 
The findings also suggest that conceptualising Irish Catholics as an historical 
bloc is not as straightforward as i t may appear on the surface. The findings 
support the argument that the attitudes of Catholics i n ths South are divergent 
f rom their Nor thern counterparts, a dis t inct ion which may prevent them from 
forming a bloc, and j o i n t l y negotiating opposit ion to Northern Protestantism 
and/or the Brit ish State. Is i t appropriate, therefore, to refer to an Irish Catholic 
culture which encompasses both N o r t h and South, or are there two distinct 
Catholic cultures which are sufficiently divergent that their j o in t opposition 
to Protestantism or the Brit ish State cannot be orchestrated? 
On the basis of these findings, we suggest that in any analysis which includes 
the whole island of Ireland, whether i t is a study o f Catholicism, of nationalism, 
or of Irish culture in general, the researcher needs to be sensitive to the intra-
Catholic cultural differences which have appeared to coincide in accordance 
w i t h the two jurisdictions in Ireland. We cannot establish whether such intra-
Catholic differences are of such magnitude that they w i l l continue to prevent 
Irish Catholics f rom negotiating some alliance against Protestant or Brit ish 
dominat ion in Nor thern Ireland. However, the existence of such differences 
should at least make us aware of the complexities involved in conceptualising 
Irish Catholics as constituting a Catholic-nationalist bloc. 
REFERENCES 
F U L T O N , J O H N , 1988. "Sociology, religion and 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland: A 
critical approach", The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 20, pp. 5-24. 
GRAMSCI , ANTONIO, 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Q. Hoare and G. 
No well Smith (Eds. & Trans.), New York: International Publishers. 
HOUT, M I C H A E L , 1989. Following Father's Footsteps. Property, Employment, and 
Occupational Mobility in Contemporary Ireland, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
M A R K E T R E S E A R C H B U R E A U OF I R E L A N D (MRBI), 1987a. Eire Inniu. An MRBI 
perspective on Irish society today, Dublin: MRBI. 
M A R K E T R E S E A R C H B U R E A U OF I R E L A N D (MRBI), 1987b. The Irish Times/MRBI 
opinion poll. Current party support, the Extradition Act, and other issues, Dublin: 
MRBI. 
6 M U I R C H E A R T A I G H , C O L M , and R.D. WIGGINS, 1977. "Sample design and evalu­
ation for an occupational mobility study", The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 8, 
pp. 101-115. 
R O S E , R I C H A R D , 1971. Governing without Consensus. An Irish Perspective, London: 
Faber and Faber. 
W H Y T E , JOHN H., 1978. "Interpretations of the Northern Ireland Problem: an Appraisal", 
The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 9, pp. 257-282. 
W H Y T E , JOHN H. , 1983. "Is Research on the Northern Ireland Problem Worth While?", 
The Queen's University of Belfast, New Lecture Series, 135. 
W H Y T E , JOHN H. , 1988. "Interpretations of the Northern Irelard Problem", in Charles 
Townshend (Ed.), Consensus in Ireland. Approaches and Recessions, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, pp. 24-46. 
